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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the impact of the global financial crisis on Nigerian listed firms' 
dividend policies. Our findings indicate that firms adjust their dividend policies in a 
manner consistent with the need to preserve financial flexibility and mitigate going-
concern risks during the crisis period. Specifically, highly leveraged firms and firms with 
low cash flows are more likely to omit dividend payments during the crisis. Moreover, the 
negative effects of foreign ownership on dividend payments during the pre-crisis are 
muted during the crisis. This suggests that the tax-induced clientele effect became 
irrelevant as cash dividends became the first order of business for foreign investors 
during the crisis. In the same vein, prevailing investor demand for cash dividends exerts a 
positive influence on firms' probability to increase dividends during the crisis, implying 
that markets attach a high valuation to firms that are able to pay during the crisis period. 
We also find support for past dividends as a reference point for current dividend 
decisions in both the crisis and non-crisis periods, although the relation is weakened 
during the crisis. This implies that some managers strive to maintain stable dividends 
during the crisis period. Nevertheless, their ability to do so weakens during this period. 
 
Keywords: dividend payout, financial crisis, financial flexibility, foreign ownership, 
signalling. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Does a firm change its dividend policy when dealing with a financial crisis? This 
is a relatively underexplored question in the literature as extant theories on 
dividend policy are generally based on the assumption of normal economic 
conditions. During the financial crisis, the issue of non-payment of dividends 
may be more pronounced compared to non-crisis periods due to the constrained 
financial position of firms resulting from the crisis or managers deliberately using 
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the crisis as an excuse to omit or reduce dividend payments. Therefore, 
companies may alter their payout polices in response to a financial crisis. Despite 
the extensive efforts made in explaining dividend policies, very little effort has 
been made to explain firm dividend payout patterns during a financial crisis. 
Existing studies in this regard are based on descriptive analysis of dividend 
payout patterns during crises. Thus, they do not provide explanation for factors 
that affect payouts during crises. 
 
 Therefore, this study seeks to contribute to prior findings on dividend 
payout policies in the pre-, during and post-financial crisis using the Nigerian 
market. Prevalence of non-payment of dividend has been reported in the Nigerian 
market as the leading financial information service in the market; Proshare News 
(2013) noted that 43 out of 200 companies listed on the market did not pay 
dividends between 2008 and 2012. Similarly, the Nigerian stock market was not 
spared from the contagion effect of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 as 
indicated by the market fundamentals. Market capitalisation dropped by 51% 
from USD 82.17 billion in 2007 to USD 33.99 billion in 2009. Thus, the crisis 
has put many companies in a difficult financial situation, and this may have an 
influence on their payout decisions. This creates an opportunity to observe 
whether dividend payout policies changed during the financial crisis compared to 
the pre- and post-financial crisis periods.  
 
 Based on the foregoing, the aim of the paper is threefold: First, we 
examine Nigerian firms' dividend policies during the pre-crisis (2003–2007), 
crisis period (2008–2009) and post-crisis period (2010–2012) with a focus on 
whether changes in the predictors of dividend payouts during the financial crisis 
is consistent with the need to preserve financial flexibility. Second, we contribute 
in terms of methodology by examining the determinants of different payout 
options (cut, increase, maintain, omit) rather than concentrating on the decision 
"to pay" or "not to pay" as previous studies have done. This is important as the 
decision "to pay" may either take the form of dividend cuts, dividend increases or 
maintaining dividend levels. It is important to examine these different payout 
choices as changes in existing dividends are more frequent than decisions on 
initiation and omissions (Li & Lie, 2006). 
 
 Third, we consider an explanation that has not received much attention in 
the literature by examining whether foreign ownership can explain payout 
decisions. The need for this derives from the dominance of foreign investors over 
domestic investors in the Nigerian market, with 61.4% foreign ownership 
reported as of 2012. The Nigerian law allows 100% foreign ownership of firms 
outside the oil and gas sector. Thus, the market is considered to be foreign driven, 
and this may have an influence on corporate policies including dividend payout 
decisions.  
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Determinants of Payout Decisions  
 
In line with Lintner's (1956) dividend smoothing hypothesis, studies show that 
firms consider their past dividend in making current dividend decisions 
(Chemmanur, He, Hu & Liu, 2010; Imran, 2011; Jasim & Hameeda, 2011). Thus, 
we predict that firms that have a past record of dividend payment will pay 
dividends by increasing, maintaining or at worst reducing dividend levels rather 
than omitting dividends entirely during normal economic conditions. However, 
we envisage that firms may abandon the trend of maintaining stable dividends 
during the crisis due to constrained financial ability. Thus, we predict further that 
past dividends may not have an effect on current dividend decisions during the 
crisis.  
 
 Rozeff (1982) argued that high leverage has a negative effect on dividend 
payment due to the need to reduce transaction costs. Dividend payment may lead 
to an increase in transaction costs associated with raising external finance 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982). This derives from the fact that as resources 
under management control are reduced through dividend payments, companies 
are forced to seek external financing by going to the capital market, and this 
involves transaction costs. In line with this, subsequent studies (Benito & Young, 
2003; Eije & Megginsson, 2007) have shown that higher leverage reduces the 
likelihood of paying cash dividends. This is based on the argument that in order 
not to increase debt levels, highly levered firms will have less preference for 
dividend payments to prevent/reduce transaction costs involved in raising 
external financing. Contrarily, other studies (Khan, Naz, Khan, Khan, Khan, & 
Mughal, 2013; Mehta, 2012) document an insignificant relationship in this 
regard. However, from another perspective, studies have shown that one of the 
ways firms attain financial flexibility is by maintaining low leverage (Daniel, 
Denis & Naveen, 2008; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2007). Thus, due to the need for 
financial flexibility, firms omit dividends to keep their leverage low (Bulan & 
Subramanian, 2008; Arslan-Ayaydin, Florackis, & Ozkan, 2014). Therefore, we 
predict in line with the transaction cost hypothesis and the need to preserve 
financial flexibility that highly levered firms will prefer to omit dividends than 
pay through any other option. We predict further that the need to preserve 
financial flexibility will cause highly levered firms to be more constrained during 
the crisis period. Thus, we expect the tendency to omit dividends rather than 
adopt the other payout choices to be higher for highly levered firms during the 
crisis. 
 
Rihanat Idowu Abdulkadir et al. 	  
106	  
 Jensen (1986) advanced the free cash flow hypothesis and contends that 
companies with considerable free cash flow may encounter agency conflicts as 
they are likely to invest in unprofitable projects. However, such conflicts can be 
mitigated through payment of dividends (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Thus, 
companies with sizeable free cash flow are more likely to pay dividends to 
prevent agency issues. In line with this, cash flow has been reported to be 
positively related to dividends by subsequent studies (Adelegan, 2003; Amidu & 
Abor, 2006; John & Muthusamy, 2010). Contrarily, other studies document a 
negative relationship between dividends and cash flow and indicate that firms 
plough back into the business with cash flow increases rather than distributing 
dividends (Bradford, Chen & Zhu, 2013; Imran, 2011). The above indicates 
inconclusive evidence on the effect of cash flows on dividend payouts. From 
another perspective, higher free cash flow indicates more financial flexibility, and 
firms that are financially flexible have better ability to pay dividends (Bancel & 
Mittoo, 2011; Bulan & Subramanian, 2008). In line with the free cash flow 
hypothesis and the notion that higher financial flexibility leads to better ability to 
pay, we predict that firms with higher cash flow will prefer to pay dividends 
either through cuts, increases or no change in dividend levels than not paying at 
all. Similarly, Chay and Suh (2005) argued that firms have a lower likelihood to 
pay dividends when there is uncertainty of cash flow, as such firms fear depletion 
of cash resources in the future. Due to the uncertainty of cash flow during the 
financial crisis, we predict further, in line with the desire of firms to preserve 
financial flexibility, that firms with lower cash flow will have higher tendency to 
omit dividends during the crisis, while firms with higher cash flow will have 
more ability to distribute dividends during such a period. 
 
 Fama and French (2001) document that the characteristics of a dividend 
payer include higher profitability, larger size and fewer investment opportunities. 
The authors indicate that firms with these characteristics are mature firms and are 
more likely to pay dividends. Subsequent studies (Al-Malkawi, 2007; Bebczuk, 
2004; Ehsan, Tabassum, Akram, & Nazir, 2013; Imran, 2011) have reported 
mixed findings on how these characteristics affect dividend payout. In line with 
Fama and French (2001), we predict that larger firms and firms with higher 
profitability will pay through these different options (cut, increase, maintain) 
rather than omitting dividends entirely. On the other hand, we predict that more 
investment opportunities will lead to a higher tendency to omit than to pay 
through any of the choices. We expect that some of the attributes of a dividend 
payer should still hold during the financial crisis. Particularly, we predict that 
more profitable firms and larger firms will have better ability to withstand any 
shock resulting from the crisis. Thus, such firms are more likely to pay through 
cuts, increases or maintaining rather than omit dividends during the crisis. 
However, we predict that firms may not see the prospects in investing during the 
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crisis; thus, growth opportunities may have no influence on payout decisions in 
such a period. 
 
 In addition to the firm characteristics discussed above, different forms of 
ownership structure have also been used to explain payout policies. However, the 
effect of foreign ownership on payout policies remains generally scant in the 
literature. In explaining foreign ownership effects, the scant studies available 
have argued either in the direction of the agency theory or in line with the 
clientele theory of dividends. Argument in line with the agency theory holds that 
dividend payment is an alternative to direct monitoring of firms by large 
shareholders targeted at reducing overinvestment problems (Easterbrook, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986). In line with this, few studies (Chai, 2010; Jeon, Lee, Moffett, 
2011; Manos, 2003; Ullah, Fida & Khan, 2012) have found a positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payment. This is based on 
the argument that foreign investors cannot directly monitor the actions of 
management; they, however, press firms to pay out cash to serve as a substitute 
for direct monitoring.  
 
 On the other hand, the tax-induced clientele effect suggests that 
differences in the tax treatment of dividends and capital gains influence investor 
preferences for a particular dividend pattern (Brennan, 1970; Elton & Gruber 
1970). Thus, investors who are tax disadvantaged will prefer low-yield firms, 
while tax advantaged investors will prefer high-yield firms. Unlike studies that 
argued based on agency theory, Ferreira, Massa, and Matos's (2010) findings 
revealed a negative relationship between foreign institutional ownership and the 
likelihood to pay dividends as well as the magnitude of dividend payments. This 
is based on the argument that foreign investors are tax disadvantaged and have 
lower preference for dividend-paying stocks. Furthermore, other studies 
document that institutional investor clientele have less preference for dividend 
paying stocks (Brav et al., 2005; Grinstein & Michaely, 2005; Hankins, Flannery 
& Nimalendran, 2008). This is attributable to reasons related to tax and 
transaction costs. Foreign investors on the NSE are predominantly institutional 
investors. Domestic investors are predominantly retail investors, while domestic 
institutional investors enjoy tax exemption on their dividend income in the 
market. Based on the unfavourable tax status of foreign investors, we predict in 
line with the tax-induced clientele theory that foreign investors have lower 
preference for dividend-paying stocks. Thus, firms will have a greater tendency 
to omit than to pay through any of the other options. However, we argue that the 
foreign ownership effect on dividend payout decisions may be altered during the 
crisis, as the dividend preference of foreign investors may change during such a 
period. Therefore, we predict that foreign ownership may lose its explanatory 
power on dividend payout decisions as a result of the crisis. 
 
Rihanat Idowu Abdulkadir et al. 	  
108	  
 Other explanations have been offered recently on dividend payout 
decisions. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) employed a new proxy for 
testing the implication of the lifecycle theory of dividends given by Fama and 
French (2001). De Angelo et al. (2006) argued that the implication of lifecycle 
theory can be tested by relating dividend payment to its mix of earned and 
contributed capital as measured by retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE) or 
high retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA). The authors consider this proxy as 
reasonable for measuring the stage of a firm in its financial lifecycle, as the proxy 
assesses the degree to which the firm is self-financing or reliant on external 
capital. Thus, it was argued that mature firms usually have most equity earned 
rather than contributed [indicated by high retained earnings to total equity 
(RE/TE) or high retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA)]. Thus, their findings 
indicate that when equity is earned rather than contributed, firms have a greater 
tendency to pay dividends as such firms are largely self-financing and are 
regarded as better candidates for dividend payment. On the other hand, the 
tendency to pay dividends is very low when most equity is contributed. Using the 
proxy of De Angelo et al. (2006), studies (El-Ansary & Gomaa, 2012; Khani & 
Dehghani, 2011; Shin, Kwon & Kim, 2010) have provided support for the 
lifecycle theory with respect to the decision to pay dividends. Contrarily, 
Ishikawa (2011) found no evidence in support of the lifecycle theory of 
dividends. In line with the approach of De Angelo et al. (2006), we predict that 
firms with higher retained earnings to total equity will prefer to pay through any 
of the different options rather than omit dividends entirely. We expect this 
prediction to still hold during the crisis as it is expected that self-financed firms 
will have better ability to withstand the crisis. 
 
 Another recent explanation on dividend payout is the catering theory of 
dividends propounded by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). This theory explains that 
managers cater to the demand of investors for dividends and therefore pay when 
investors place a high premium on dividend payers and do not pay when 
investors prefer no dividend payment. Thus, the theory predicts that firms are 
more likely to pay dividends when the dividend premium is high. Baker and 
Wurgler (2004b) found that catering theory is the most significant explanation for 
dividend initiation and omission decisions. Empirical studies (Eije & 
Megginsson, 2007; Ferris, Jayaranam & Sabherwal, 2009; Li & Lie, 2006) 
subsequently provided support for catering theory, as the dividend premium was 
found to be positively related to payout decisions. Contrarily, Baker, Saadi, Dutta 
and Gandhi (2007) indicate that managers did not express support for catering 
theory in their dividend decisions. In line with catering theory, we predict that 
firms will pay through any of these options (cut, increase, maintain) rather than 
omit dividends entirely when the dividend premium is high. We predict that 
catering theory will be more relevant during the crisis as firms desire to retain 
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investor confidence and will respond more to their demand for dividends during 
such a critical period.  
 
Dividend Behaviour during the Financial Crisis 
 
A dividend cut is usually considered undesirable as it may send negative signals 
to investors; however, Reddemann, Basse, and Johann-Matthias (2010) argued 
that a dividend cut is an appropriate act to ensure financial stability during 
distress. Their findings indicate that during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, 
insurance firms in Europe adjusted their dividend policies through dividend cuts 
to strengthen liquidity and preserve their capital base. Similarly, a survey study 
by Bancel and Mittoo (2011) revealed that one of the ways in which managers of 
French firms preserved financial flexibility during the global financial crisis was 
through dividend cuts. De Angelo and De Angelo (1990) reported similar 
findings on NYSE firms during the financial distress that occurred between 1980 
and 1985. Their findings revealed that managers reduced dividends significantly 
in response to the crisis, and this was attributed to poor financial performance 
witnessed during the distress period.  
 
 Hauser (2013) also observed that the tendency to cut dividends increased 
among US firms between 2008 and 2009 due to low cash ratios, which resulted 
from the financial crisis. In another study, Bistrova and Lace (2012) reported that 
23% of the total number of dividend payers in the Central Eastern European 
(CEE) region ceased payments of dividends during the 2008 and 2009 financial 
crisis. Similarly, Ronapat and Evans (2005) documented that the Asian financial 
crisis that occurred within their study period led to an increase in the number of 
non-payers on the Thailand Stock Exchange due to the financial distress 
witnessed by the firms. In the same vein, Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) noted that the 
financial crisis experienced in the Istanbul market in the year 2001 led to a 
significant reduction in the number of dividend-paying firms.  
 
 Bebczuk's (2004) findings differ slightly as the result of the study 
indicates that firms in Argentina increased dividends at the beginning of the crisis 
and then subsequently cut dividends. It was argued that the initial increase 
resulted from the desire of investors to change their domestic wealth into dollars. 
This pressed firms to pay high dividends to allow investors to safeguard 
themselves from expected devaluation. The authors attributed the subsequent cut 
to a weak financial position and a lack of alternative financing sources. Floyd, Li, 
and Skinner (2011) reported that financial and industrial firms in North America 
adjusted their dividend policies in different ways in response to the financial 
crisis. Financial firms cut dividends sharply between 2008 and 2009, while 
industrial firms modestly reduced their dividends with a barely noticeable drop 
during the same period. Dividend patterns of financial firms during the crisis 
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were attributed to dire financial circumstances and direct regulatory intervention 
that forced them to cut their payouts. On the other hand, the barely noticeable 
drop in dividend payments by the industrials during the crisis was linked to 
manager reluctance to cut dividends. 
 
 Contrarily, other evidence indicates that dividend payments increased 
during the financial crisis. Kuo, Philip, and Zhang (2013) revealed that the global 
financial crisis influenced dividend payments in the UK positively, as a 
considerable upward trend occurred during the period. The authors attributed this 
to the desire of firms to signal sound financial health to sustain increased investor 
confidence. Similarly, Acharya, Gujral, and Shin (2009) reported that despite the 
huge losses recorded by sampled banks in the US, UK and Europe during the 
crisis period, these banks paid dividends throughout the crisis. The authors 
argued that such payment depleted the banks' capital. However, other studies 
found no evidence to indicate that firms alter their payout policies during crises. 
Mollah (2011) reported no significant difference in the payout behaviour of firms 
on the Dhaka Stock Exchange before, during and after the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 and 1998. Similarly, Sierpińska and Mlodkowski (2010) reported that 
Japanese firms did not decrease dividend payments during the prolonged crisis 
that occurred between 1991 and 2008. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that 
the empirical evidence on dividend payment during crises is inconclusive, thus 
necessitating further research in this area. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The study is based on a sample of 126 non-financial firms listed on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2012. We identify three distinct sub-samples 
that include the pre-crisis period (2003–2007), crisis period (2008–2009), and 
post-crisis period (2010–2012). For the purposes of this study, we define the 
crisis period as the years 2008 and 2009, as the impact of the global financial 
crisis was primarily felt in these years. Consistent with prior studies, we exclude 
financial firms, as most countries subject such firms to certain requirements and 
restrictions to ensure confidence and stability in the financial system. Such 
regulatory issues may distort results (Ap Gwilym, Seaton, & Thomas, 2004). The 
final sample after the deletion of missing values and outliers is 1048 firm-year 
observations. Data on firm level characteristics were obtained from the financial 
reports of the listed companies. We also obtained data on stock market 
performance from various issues of the fact book of the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
and data on macroeconomic variables from Datastream. Descriptive analysis is 
used to show how the firms have adjusted their dividend policies during the 
financial crisis, while multinomial logistic regression analysis is used to identify 
the determinants of the different payout options across the different sub-samples. 
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Logistic regression is employed because the dependent variable is categorical in 
nature. Specifically, the study employs multinomial logistic regression because 
the dependent variable has more than two categorical outcomes. 
 
 The multinomial logit model estimated is given as follows. The 
dependent variable in the model is the firm dividend payout decision, which is 
broken into four discrete payout choices: The decision to cut dividends, the 
decision to increase dividends, the decision to maintain dividends, and the 
decision to omit dividends; thus, the dependent variable is measured as a dummy 
variable with values of 1, 2, 3, 4 for the different payout choices, respectively. 
There are nine explanatory variables in the model, and the study relies on the 
literature to obtain the measurement of these variables. We employ the proxies 
for the variables based on what is commonly used in the dividend literature. 
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is measured as the percentage of foreign investor 
shareholdings to total shareholdings. The variable tests the implication of the tax-
induced clientele theory, and it is included in the model because it has not 
received much attention in the dividend literature. In addition, the rise in the 
percentage of foreign investor shareholdings in the Nigerian market necessitates 
its inclusion. Dividend premium (PREM) is the proxy for catering theory. In line 
with Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 2004b), it is measured as the log difference 
between the average market to book ratio for payers and non-payers. Retained 
earnings to total equity (RE/TE) is the proxy for the lifecycle theory. As given by 
De Angelo et al. (2006), it is measured as retained earnings divided by total 
equity. Catering and lifecycle theories are relatively new theories. They have 
primarily been tested in developed markets and are yet to be applied in an 
African setting. Thus, we include the proxies for these theories in the model to 
ascertain whether they can also explain payout policies in the Nigerian market. 
All the other variables in the model have been tested by previous studies, and 
they are regarded as traditional determinants of dividend payouts. Thus, these 
traditional determinants are included in the model to ensure that the model is 
correctly specified. SIZE, ROA, and INV represent the characteristics of a 
dividend payer. SIZE is the size of the firm, and it is measured as the natural log 
of total assets. ROA is the measure of firm profitability, and it is measured as net 
income divided by total assets.1 INV represents the growth opportunities of the 
firm, and it is measured using the market-to-book ratio. Most studies use this 
ratio as a proxy for investment opportunities as it has higher information content 
than the price-earnings ratio, which some studies also employ (Adam & Goyal, 
2008). 
 
 CF is the cash flow of the firm. We employ the popular measure of cash 
flow, which is the net cash flow from operating activities. This is extracted 
directly from the companies' statement of cash flow in the reports. LEV 
represents the leverage of the firm. The study employs debt to total assets, which 
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is commonly used as a measure of leverage in the dividend literature. Both CF 
and LEV, in addition to explaining the free cash flow hypothesis and transaction 
cost hypothesis, respectively, have been used to provide an explanation for 
financial flexibility. PYDPS stands for dividend payment in the previous year, 
and it explains the stability of the dividend. 
( )
( ) 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it
6 it 7 it 8 it 9 it
pr DIV j
= α + β FOREIGN + β PREMIUM + β RE/TE + β SIZE + β ROA
pr DIV m
                             + β INV + β CF + β PYDPS + 
In
LEVβ
=
=  
         
In the equation above, j represents the different outcome levels: 1 (cut dividend), 
2 (increase dividend), and 3 (maintain dividend), while m is the base outcome, 4 
(omit dividend). Outcome level 4 (decision to omit dividend) is chosen as the 
base outcome not only because it is the outcome with the highest category, which 
the software chooses automatically, but also because it is regarded as the most 
extreme way that firms can adjust their dividend during a crisis. Apart from the 
choice to "omit dividend", all other options still fall under the choice to pay.  
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
The summary statistics of the variables in the regression model are presented in 
Table 1 for the different sub-periods. After deletion of missing values and 
outliers, the table shows 471 firm-year observations for the pre-crisis period, 227 
firm-year observations for the crisis period and 350 firm-year observations for 
the post-crisis period. The firm payout decision is a dummy variable with four 
outcome levels. The statistics in Table 1 reveal that on average, foreign investors 
own 11% of total shareholdings in the Nigerian Stock Exchange in the pre-crisis 
period. The mean value increased to 24% during the crisis and to 55% in the 
post-crisis period. This indicates a consistent rise in foreign ownership in the 
market. The mean value of dividend premium shows that investor demand for 
dividends increased considerably during the crisis. The highest mean value (0.68) 
was reported during the crisis, while the lowest mean value was reported in the 
pre-crisis period (0.39). Thus, investors place higher value on dividend-paying 
firms during the crisis than during non-crisis periods, indicating higher 
preference for funds due to the economic downturn.  
 
 The mean value of retained earnings to total equity, which is 
approximately 37% in the pre-crisis period, dropped to 23% during the crisis and 
increased to 47% in the post-crisis period. This implies that firms have less 
retained earnings in the composition of their equity during the crisis. Thus, they 
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have less retained earnings to rely on due to a decline in earnings during the 
period. The mean value of size, which increased across the different sub-periods, 
indicates the expansion of firms over the years. The highest mean value was 
reported in the post-crisis period. Thus, as measured by the natural log of total 
assets, the average size of the firm in the post-crisis period is 22.5 (USD112 
million).  
 
Decline in the profitability of firms is shown by the mean figures, which 
declined from 19% in the pre-crisis period to 10% and 9% during the crisis and 
post-crisis period, respectively. This suggests that firms recorded declines in 
profitability during the crisis, and the effect of the crisis possibly extended until 
the post-crisis period. The table indicates the availability of valuable investment 
opportunities amongst firms listed in the market across the different sub-periods. 
A market-to-book ratio of less than one indicates a lack of valuable investment 
opportunities (Chung, Wright, & Charoenwong, 1998). The ratio is above one for 
the different sub-periods, although the least value was recorded during the crisis. 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
 Pre-Crisis  
(2003–2007) 
Crisis (2008 & 2009) Post-Crisis  
(2010–2012) 
Variables Obs Mean S.D.  Obs Mean S.D.  Obs Mean S.D.  
DIV (1,2,3,4) 471   227   350   
Foreign 
ownership 
471 0.109 0.383 227 0.238 0.434 350 0.549 0.222 
Dividend 
premium 
471 0.388 0.131 227 0.681 0.384 350 0.525 0.238 
Retained 
earnings to total 
equity 
471 0.371 1.307 227 0.227 1.150 350 0.470 1.163 
Size 471 21.26 1.892 227 22.13 1.825 350 22.51 1.846 
Profitability 471 0.185 0.620 227 0.104 0.637 350 0.095 0.642 
Growth 
opportunity 
471 1.951 1.514 227 1.813 1.558 350 1.946 1.323 
Cash flow 471 0.292 0.288 227 0.193 0.608 350 0.172 0.927 
Leverage 471 0.484 0.529 227 0.502 0.318 350 0.528 0.360 
Past dividend 471 0.719 1.406 227 0.586 1.798 350 0.516 1.833 
 
 There is an indication that firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
are highly levered across the different sub-periods. In the pre-crisis period, 48% 
of total assets were financed by debt as reflected in the mean value. This 
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increased to 50% during the crisis and increased further to 53% in the post-crisis 
period. Descriptive statistics also reveal that cash flow levels decreased during 
the crisis. The mean value of cash flow decreased from 0.29 in the pre-crisis 
period to 0.19 during the crisis. The figure decreased slightly in the post-crisis 
period. Thus, firms suffered depletion in cash flow levels as a result of the crisis. 
The mean value of past dividends decreased over the sub-periods, indicating a 
decline in the average dividends paid by firms in the market.  
 
Dividend Adjustment in Response to Financial Crisis 
 
Figure 1 depicts the nominal dividends as well as the proportion of dividend 
payers over the period. The dotted line in Figure 1 indicates that nominal 
dividends recorded a consistent rise in the pre-crisis period (2003–2007). The 
figure rose from USD228 million to USD406 million. However, the proportion of 
dividend payers declined during this period (except in 2004, when an increase 
occurred). The proportion of dividend payers fell from 57% in the year 2003 to 
52% in the year 2007. This signifies that the increased dividend payments during 
this period were coming from a reduced number of payers. 
 
	  
Figure 1.   Dividend payment on the NSE (2003–2012) 
 
The crisis period (2008 and 2009) witnessed a varying trend. At the early 
stage of the crisis (2008), both the nominal dividends as well as the proportion of 
dividend payers increased. However, both figures declined in the year 2009. The 
proportion of payers rose by 25% in 2008 and then fell by 34% in 2009. A sharp 
increase in the amount of dividends paid was also recorded in the year 2008 as 
the nominal dividends, which were USD407 million in 2007, increased to 
USD734 million in 2008 and then declined again to USD499 million in 2009 
when the crisis was at its worst. There was an initial sign of recovery in the post-
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crisis period (2010-2012) as nominal dividends increased in the year 2010. 
However, the reverse trend occurred in the last two years, indicating that the 
recovery was not sustained. On the other hand, the percentage of dividend payers 
recorded consistently fell from 2009 to 2012. Nominal dividends, which 
increased to USD786 million in 2010, fell to USD416.7 million in 2012. The 
trend during the crisis indicates that dividend payments were greatly affected in 
the second year of the crisis. More explanation on this is given in the subsequent 
sub-section. 
 
Table 2 
Dividend payout choices on the Nigerian stock exchange (in percentage) 
 
Year Cut dividend Increase 
dividend 
Maintain 
dividend 
Omit dividend  
2003 21.7 28.3 7.6 42.4  
2004 14.1 34.8 12.0 39.1  
2005 15.2 27.2 13.0 44.6  
2006 13.7 28.4 12.6 45.3  
2007 5.0 31.0 16.0 48.0  
2008 14.5 41.8 9.2 34.5  
2009 17.9 18.8 6.0 57.3  
2010 12.6 21.0 7.6 58.8  
2011 11.8 15.3 11.0 61.9  
2012 11.8 15.3 6.0 66.9  
Average 13.8 26.19 10.1 49.9  
 
 To gain insight into how firms adjusted their dividend policies during the 
study period, Table 2 presents the proportion of firms that cut, increase, maintain 
or omit dividends over the study period. Following the approach of Andres, 
Betzer, Bongard, Haesner, and Theissen (2013), dividend increasing (decreasing) 
events are defined as changes in dividends that constitute more than a 5% 
increase (decrease) in dividend per share. Dividend-maintaining events constitute 
dividend changes of equal to or less than 5%. Non-payment in a particular period 
is regarded as dividend omission.  
 
 Table 2 shows that the percentage of firms that cut dividends decreased 
from the year 2003 to 2007 (except in the year 2005). The percentage that had 
declined to 5% in 2007 increased during the crisis to 14.5% and 17.9% in 2008 
and 2009, respectively. The percentage declined again from the year 2010 
onwards. The percentage of firms that omitted dividends increased from the year 
2003 to 2007 (except for a decline recorded in 2004). In the year 2008, the 
percentage decreased by 28% from what was recorded in 2007. However, the 
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percentage increased again in the year 2009 with a 19% increase above what was 
recorded in 2007. Increases in the percentage of dividend-omitting firms 
continued from the year 2010 to 2012. 
 
 The percentage of firms that increased dividends fluctuated between the 
years 2003 and 2007. However, regardless of the crisis, some firms still recorded 
dividend increases in the years 2008 and 2009. This supports the signalling 
theory as firms may desire to portray a sound financial condition despite the 
crisis. However, the proportion of firms that recorded dividend increases, which 
increased to 41.8% in 2008, declined to 18.8% in 2009. In the year 2010, the 
percentage increased again but fell in the years 2011 and 2012. Similarly, the 
percentage of firms that maintained dividends increased between the years 2003 
and 2007 (except in 2006). In accordance with the dividend smoothing 
hypothesis, Table 2 indicates that some firms maintained their dividends despite 
the crisis; however, a drop in the percentage of such firms was recorded for both 
years of the crisis, 2008 and 2009. The proportion of firms that maintained 
dividends decreased from 16% in 2007 to 9.2% in 2008 and decreased further to 
6.0% in 2009. The proportion increased again in 2010 and 2011 but fell in 2012.  
 
 Consequently, it can be inferred that the negative impact of the crisis was 
primarily felt at the peak of the crisis, the year 2009. We attribute the rise in 
dividends at the beginning of the crisis to the desire to signal sound financial 
standing even in the face of crisis. The subsequent decline in 2009 may be due to 
the inability of some firms to sustain an increase in dividend payments due to 
aggravation of the effect of the crisis and the costs associated with signalling. 
Miller and Rock (1985) noted that a major cost associated with signalling is the 
need to maintain paying high level of dividends, which small firms cannot 
imitate. Thus, many firms might have cut down their dividends in the year 2009 
due to the inability to sustain signalling costs. 
 
   Our findings concur with the findings of Bebczuk (2004) on the 
Argentine stock market, which is also an emerging market. The findings reported 
that Argentine firms paid higher dividends at the start of the crisis and 
subsequently cut dividends. Descriptive analysis suggests further that firms listed 
in the Nigerian market have primarily adjusted their dividends in response to the 
crisis through dividend cuts. Although dividend omissions recorded high figures 
in both years of the crisis, this level has been maintained from the beginning of 
the study period. Thus, it cannot be totally attributed to the crisis. In addition, the 
percentage of firms that omitted dividends increased only at the peak of the crisis. 
Findings that indicate that firms adjusted their dividends through cuts match prior 
findings (Bancel & Mittoo, 2011; De Angelo & De Angelo, 1990; Hauser, 2013; 
Reddemann et al., 2010) that also reported firms cut dividends during the 
financial crisis to strengthen their liquidity. The average value of each outcome 
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level of the dependent variable depicted at the bottom of Table 2 shows that 
approximately 50% of the sampled firms omitted dividends over the study period. 
 
Regression Results 
 
The logit model is a non-linear model, and therefore, the assumptions related to 
the distribution of independent variables such as linearity, normality and 
homoscedasticity are not required to be satisfied to execute the models (Schwab, 
2010). However, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to test for the 
existence of possible multicollinearity. The mean VIF (1.22) and the VIF values 
for each of the variables fall below 10. Thus, the model has no problem of 
multicollinearity. 
 
 The estimation results from multinomial logistic regression analysis are 
presented in Table 3. The model's likelihood ratio x2 values of 163.9, 61.7, and 
67.9 are statistically significant at 1%. This indicates the overall fit of the model 
for all the sub-periods. The coefficient estimates compare the likelihood of 
different payout options [cutting dividends (1), increasing dividends (2), 
maintaining dividends (3)] to the likelihood of omitting dividends (4). The 
number of observations is 1048: The pre-crisis period has 471 observations, the 
crisis period has 227 observations and the post-crisis period has 350 observations.  
 
Payout Choices before the Crisis 
 
Factors explaining dividend payout choices in the pre-crisis period include 
foreign ownership, retained earnings to total equity, size, profitability and past 
dividends. The results shows that firms with a higher level of foreign ownership 
prefer to omit dividends than to pay through dividend cuts or dividend increases. 
Consistent with the tax-induced clientele effect, we attribute this to the fact that 
foreign investors in the Nigerian market are predominantly institutional investors 
who have less preference for dividends due to their unfavourable tax status and 
reasons related to transaction costs. Our finding suggests that firms listed in the 
market shape their dividend payout policies to suit the preference of foreign 
investors in the pre-crisis period. However, the result does not support the agency 
theory, which argues that foreign investors will press for more dividends to 
substitute for direct monitoring. 
 
Rihanat Idowu Abdulkadir et al. 	  
118	  
             
Dividend Policy Changes	  
119	  
 Findings on past dividends indicate that firms with a past record of 
dividends will maintain, increase or at worst reduce dividend levels rather than 
omit them entirely. This implies that past dividends are a reference point for 
current dividend decisions on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. In particular, the 
result that indicates that firms will prefer to maintain rather than omit dividends 
is consistent with the dividend smoothing hypothesis of Lintner (1956). Two of 
the characteristics of a dividend payer indicated by Fama and French (2001) are 
supported in the pre-crisis period. Findings show that more profitable firms will 
prefer to pay through any of these options (cut, increase, maintain) rather than not 
paying at all. Similarly, results obtained for size indicate that larger firms will 
prefer to increase or maintain dividends than to omit. The negative coefficient 
obtained for retained earnings to total equity contradicts the prediction of the life 
cycle theory. Thus, firms that place more reliance on earned capital will prefer to 
omit dividends than to pay through any of the other options. This finding 
suggests that firms plough back funds into investment opportunities when they 
rely more on earned capital. Variables found insignificant in the pre-crisis period 
include dividend premium, growth opportunities, leverage and cash flow. This 
indicates lack of evidence in support of catering theory, transaction cost 
hypothesis and the free cash flow theory during this period. Lack of support for 
leverage and cash flow also indicates that firms do not prioritise maintaining 
financial flexibility before the crisis. 
 
Payout Choices during the Crisis 
 
Findings indicate a shift in dividend policy during the crisis as a predictor of 
dividend changes during this period. Theories that could not explain dividend 
policy in the pre-crisis period became relevant during the crisis (catering theory; 
transaction cost hypothesis; free cash flow hypothesis). Factors found significant 
during the crisis include: dividend premium; profitability; leverage; cash flow; 
and past dividend. Contrary to expectations that the crisis may impede the ability 
of firms to respond to investor demand for dividends, findings show that firms 
respond to demand for dividends by increasing rather than omitting when the 
dividend premium is high. This is in agreement with the catering theory of 
dividends (Baker & Wurgler, 2004a) and shows that firms cater to meet investor 
demand for dividends during the crisis. This suggests that Nigerian companies 
become more conscious of investor demand and perceive that dividends are 
particularly important to investors during a crisis period and thus respond to 
demand for dividends.  
 
 Leverage and cash flow also became significant during the crisis. The 
results indicate that firms with higher debt levels will prefer not to pay at all than 
paying through increases or even through dividend reductions. Thus, firms 
become mindful of their debt level during a crisis. This finding is consistent with 
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the transaction cost hypothesis and indicates that highly levered firms are 
particularly concerned about reducing transaction costs for raising external 
financing during a crisis. Contrarily, findings indicate that firms with higher cash 
flow will cut or increase dividends rather than omit dividends entirely. The 
results obtained for cash flow suggests that companies seek to boost investor 
confidence, which may be eroded during a crisis. Thus, consistent with the free 
cash flow hypothesis, companies with higher free cash flow will tend to distribute 
dividends rather than omit to indicate that such funds are not invested in 
unprofitable investments. Moreover, findings on leverage and cash flow that 
indicate that highly levered firms and firms with lower cash flows will prefer to 
omit than to pay through increases or reductions is an indication of the need to 
preserve funds during the crisis. Thus, financial flexibility becomes a priority 
during a crisis. 
 
 Findings indicate that the explanatory role of profitability is unaffected 
by the crisis. This finding is also in line with the fact that firms that have better 
financial slack have more ability to distribute dividends during a crisis. The role 
of past dividends weakened during the crisis, indicating that firms' ability to 
maintain stable dividends declined as a result of the crisis. Other variables 
(foreign ownership; retained earnings to total equity; size) lost significance 
during the crisis. The insignificance of foreign ownership during the crisis 
indicates that the tax-induced clientele theory became irrelevant. Therefore, firms 
are not concerned about shaping dividend policies to suit the preferences of 
foreign investors during the crisis. Results obtained on foreign ownership during 
the crisis also do not support the agency theory that foreign investors will press 
for more dividends to substitute for direct monitoring. Growth opportunities 
remain insignificant even during the crisis. Therefore, among the characteristics 
of a dividend payer given by Fama and French (2001), only profitability is 
relevant in explaining payout choices during the crisis. This matches our 
expectation that more profitable firms should have better ability to withstand any 
shock that may result from the crisis. 
 
Payout Choices Post Crisis 
 
Findings indicate strong resemblances in payout policy during the crisis and in 
the post-crisis period. Apart from foreign ownership, which became significant 
again in the post-crisis period, all other variables remain as they were during the 
crisis. All the predictors of alternative payout choices during the crisis remained 
significant in the post-crisis period under the same outcome categories. This 
suggests that the effect of the crisis is still felt in the post-crisis period. Our 
evidence indicates considerable changes in dividend policy during the crisis, as 
some theories only become relevant as a result of the crisis and others lose 
significance due to the crisis. 
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Plausible Explanation for Shift in Dividend Policy During the Crisis 
 
Some studies indicate that firms tend to pay more to signal sound financial health 
during a financial crisis, while others state that firms reduce dividends to preserve 
financial flexibility. Evidence from descriptive analysis indicates the presence of 
a signalling motive evidenced by an increase in dividend payouts in the year 
2008; however, this could not be sustained.  
 
 Our evidence indicates that the need to preserve financial flexibility 
prevailed above the signalling motive. Descriptive analysis indicates a sharp 
decline in nominal dividends at the peak of the crisis (the year 2009). Similarly, a 
careful look at Table 2 shows that the magnitude of change in dividend 
reductions during the crisis is the highest compared to the other payout choices. 
Dividend cuts rose by 258% between the year 2007 and year 2009. Moreover, 
our findings indicate that predictors of dividend payout changed during the crisis 
in a manner consistent with the need to preserve financial flexibility. Retained 
earnings to total equity, which became insignificant during the crisis, suggests 
that dividend omissions by firms during the crisis are not tailored towards 
ploughing back for investment; rather, it suggests the need to conserve funds. 
Similarly, the insignificance of size during the crisis suggests that bigger firms 
may not necessarily pay dividends either through increases or maintaining 
dividend levels from the pre-crisis period. This indicates that such firms may 
have a different motive, i.e., the need to preserve cash. Most importantly, using 
leverage and cash flow as indicators of financial flexibility, Bancel and Mittoo 
(2011) argued that firms with higher financial flexibility suffer a lower impact 
from the crisis. Therefore, our finding, which shows that leverage and cash flow 
only became relevant during the crisis, indicates the importance of financial 
flexibility in such periods. In addition, Miller and Rock (1985) noted that a major 
cost associated with signalling is the need to maintain paying high levels of 
dividends, which small firms cannot imitate. On the other hand, studies have 
shown that one of the ways in which financial flexibility can be achieved during a 
crisis is through dividend cuts. Therefore, signalling costs, which entail keeping 
dividend payments at high levels, may be difficult to maintain during a crisis as a 
result of the need to preserve financial flexibility. Thus, many firms might have 
cut down their dividends in the year 2009 due to the inability to sustain signalling 
costs. Therefore, we infer from our findings that changes in dividend policy 
during a financial crisis indicate the inability of firms to sustain signalling costs 
due to the need to preserve financial flexibility.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Based on a sample of 1048 firm-year observations obtained from 126 companies 
over 10 years (2003–2012), we investigate factors that influence a firm's dividend 
payout decisions over three distinct sub-samples. We investigate further whether 
dividend policy changed during the financial crisis and the possible explanation 
for the changes observed. Our evidence, which indicates a noticeable shift in 
dividend policy across the different sub-periods, is consistent with the notion that 
dividend policy changes during financial crises. We provide empirical evidence 
on how dividend policy changed during the crisis in a manner consistent with the 
need to preserve financial flexibility. Findings indicate that firms with higher 
leverage and lower cash flow are more likely to omit dividends during the crisis. 
Specifically, our findings indicate that some dividend policies become costly to 
maintain as a result of the crisis. Tax-induced clientele lost relevance, indicating 
that firms do not shape dividend policies to suit the preference of the foreign 
investors during the crisis. The role of dividend smoothing also weakened, and 
this shows that the ability of firms to maintain stable dividends decreased as a 
result of the crisis. However, dividend policies that help preserve firms' cash 
flows, as indicated in the transaction cost hypothesis, become crucial during the 
crisis period. Thus, firms become more concerned about maintaining adequate 
financial slack due to the uncertainty associated with the crisis. In addition, 
dividend policies that will increase firms' valuation are adopted during the crisis. 
This is reflected in the catering theory, which only became significant during this 
period.  
 
 Findings on the predictors of alternative payout decisions will serve as a 
guide to existing and potential investors in shaping their investment plans. 
Stakeholders will be aware that financial viability is an important consideration 
in firm payout policies during a crisis. Given such awareness, firms reducing 
dividend levels during a crisis may have no cause to fear negative investors' 
reaction, as such cuts will be generally viewed as necessary to preserve financial 
flexibility. The findings of the study will also be useful to policy makers in 
developing improved policies for managing any crisis that may occur in the 
future. They will also serve as a guide to regulatory authorities for future policy 
direction when setting rules that relate to dividend payments. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.   In unreported results, our findings on profitability are robust to the use of 
ROE as its proxy. We found ROE to be consistently significant across the 
different sub-periods. 
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